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Philip Robins’s famous question, “What on earth is happening in Turkey?” has been echoing around the capitals of the Atlantic com-
munity, uttered variously in exasperation, 
in admiration and in wonder.1 The same 
refrain recently has been repeatedly raised 
around Turkey’s careening towards an 
activist foreign policy in the Middle East, 
its increased willingness to break with its 
trans-atlantic allies on critical decisions 
and over its policies in Syria. A closer look 
at the structural dynamics of the U.S.-Tur-
key security partnership, however, reflects 
that the systemic factors underpinning the 
alliance are alive and well. The alarmist 
discourse is giving primacy to agency over 
structure and is hampered by “presentist” 
conceptions, leading to a distorted under-
standing of the half-century partnership 
between the United States and Turkey.
It is true that the U.S.-Turkey security 
partnership is going through a rough patch. 
The direction Turkey’s domestic politics 
has taken in recent years, Turkey’s aspira-
tions for greater latitude in shaping region-
al politics, and the incongruity of Turkey’s 
security interests with the policy objectives 
of its Western allies have all contributed to 
these troubles. Yet, the alarmists accusing 
Turkey of abandoning the West are em-
bracing a one-sided and distorted narrative 
that further antagonizes Ankara and deep-
ens the rift with its Western allies. 
The path to a robust alliance that 
can address the myriad challenges in the 
Middle East and beyond is a constructive 
dialogue between Turkey and its allies 
aimed at identifying the fulcrum that bal-
ances Turkey’s legitimate security interests 
with the broader objectives of its allies.
LOSING — AND REDISCOVERING 
— TURKEY
Turkey’s opening of the Incirlik Air 
Base to coalition forces fighting Islamic 
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State (IS) militants was widely welcomed, 
reflecting worries about the allegedly 
moribund state of the U.S.-Turkey alli-
ance. “The [Incirlik] agreement seems 
a watershed moment,”2 the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy’s Andrew J. 
Tabler told The New York Times. Tweeting 
on the news, “Incirlik, at last!”3 exclaimed 
Ambassador Martin Indyk, former U.S. 
peace mediator. James Stavridis praised 
the deal as a triumph for NATO: “[Its 
Syrian] border is not Turkey’s alone: It 
is NATO’s border as well.”4 The senti-
ment was similar on the Turkish side. TRT 
World, the English-language service of 
Turkey’s state broadcaster, ran the news 
with the title “Turkey-U.S. realignment 
reaches top point.”5
The jubilation was not untimely. Over 
the last years, the U.S. foreign-policy 
establishment had grown increasingly dis-
illusioned with its allies in the Middle East 
over their inaction against (and alleged 
complicity in) the rise of the Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). A slew of es-
tablishment figures from Richard Haass6 to 
Leslie Gelb7 to Ryan Crocker8 had publicly 
questioned why America should remain 
committed to allies that haven’t been doing 
it much good against ISIS, whereas Assad 
is fighting the good fight, and Iran seems 
much nicer than it was.
These criticisms were explicitly aimed 
at Arabian Gulf monarchies like Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, but they were also im-
plicitly addressed to Turkey, NATO’s only 
Muslim-majority member and an unruly 
partner that increasingly frustrated its 
trans-atlantic allies. These latent tensions 
in the U.S.-Turkey security partnership, 
which were by no means new, as discussed 
below, culminated over Syria. Turkey’s 
continued support for opposition groups, 
and its intransigence on a solution that 
both ousted Assad and denied the Kurds an 
independent enclave in the north, proved 
a challenge to NATO’s broader policy 
objectives.
In more sensationalistic accounts, 
Turkey’s divergent interests were ex-
trapolated into an alleged complicity with 
ISIS. According to this narrative, Turkey’s 
frustration with U.S. hesitancy to push for 
Assad’s ouster in full force had led it to 
secretly support ISIS and other Islamist 
groups as a means of containing the Kurds 
while further weakening the Assad regime. 
These were allegations of doubtful verac-
ity. A study by the Carter Center had actu-
ally found that the Assad regime spared 
ISIS in 90 percent of its attacks,9 and a 
separate study by the IHS Jane’s Terrorism 
and Insurgency Center (JTIC) found that 
the regime targeted ISIS in only 6 percent 
of its attacks.10
Yet, Turkey’s alleged support for ISIS 
remained a persistent theme in the public 
discourse. A July 2014 report in Newsweek 
quoted a former ISIS member that “ISIS 
saw the Turkish army as its ally, especially 
when it came to fighting the Kurds.”11 
There were also wilder allegations vary-
ing from weapons smuggling12 to illicit oil 
trade13 to turning a blind eye to Islamist 
recruitment in suburban neighborhoods.14
The watershed moment in U.S.-Turkey 
relations came with the siege of Kobani 
in October 2014. Despite Turkey’s well-
known concerns about the objectives and 
character of the Kurdish Democratic Party 
(PYD) and its embedded militia, the Kurd-
ish People’s Protection Units (YPG) — a 
fighting force with ties to the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK) that has been des-
ignated a “foreign terrorist organization” 
by the U.S. Department of State — the 
United States decided to provide military 
and humanitarian aid into Kobani to help 
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the Kurds push the ISIS offensive back.15 A 
second concern was the accusation that the 
Kurds were conducting ethnic cleansing 
against Sunni Arabs and Turkmens with 
the intention of creating a de facto Kurd-
ish enclave in northern Syria.16 Although 
PYD has been adamantly denying these 
accusations, a recent report by Amnesty 
International alleged that the “Kurdish 
forces have carried out a wave of forced 
displacement and mass house demolitions, 
amounting to war crimes.”17
At the time, Turkey’s policies on 
Kobani were largely portrayed as refus-
ing to help the besieged Kurds, a narrative 
that dovetailed with allegations of Turkish 
support for Islamist groups in Syria. This, 
however, was a factually erroneous charac-
terization. More than 130,000 Kurds were 
allowed to cross into Turkey in the first 
days of the ISIS offensive,18 and eventually 
the number exceeded 400,000.19
Nonetheless, Kobani emerged as a 
foil for those questioning whether Tur-
key really deserves to belong in NATO. 
On October 9, Jonathan Schanzer of the 
Foundation for the Defense of Democra-
cies wrote for Politico a sharply worded 
criticism arguing, “Turkey under the AKP 
is a lost cause” and asking whether it was 
“time to kick Turkey out of NATO.”20 
A few days later, the influential French 
intellectual Bernard Henri-Levy echoed 
the same sentiment in The New Republic: 
“If Kobane [sic] becomes the name of 
yet another Turkish default [on its NATO 
allies], this one inexcusable — its future 
in NATO is in doubt.”21 Historian Conrad 
Black wrote in even less uncertain terms: 
“Tell the Turks to stop supporting terror-
ism — or get out of NATO.”22
The troubles over Kobani were also 
partly anchored in Washington’s simmer-
ing concerns about the Erdoğan adminis-
tration. As Simon Tisdall astutely observed 
in his commentary on the Incirlik deal, 
“demands for Turkey’s assistance [in Syr-
ia] were doubly unwelcome given Wash-
ington’s criticism of Erdoğan’s authori-
tarian, neo-Islamist leadership style, his 
attacks on human rights and press freedom, 
and his open hostility to a key U.S. ally, Is-
rael.”23 “[NATO] is a coalition of countries 
with shared values,” wrote Columbia Uni-
versity’s David L. Philips; “If NATO were 
being established today, Turkey would not 
qualify as a member.”24 As Michael Werz 
and Max Hoffman observed, “The White 
House’s frustration about Turkey’s ap-
proach and President Erdoğan’s constant 
public sniping and populist demagoguery 
provided some context for the military and 
strategic decision to save Kobani.”25
While Syria was an important aspect of 
the mutual frustration between Turkey and 
the United States, it was by no means the 
only one. Another point of contention was 
Turkey’s long-range missile-defense tender 
after Ankara rejected bids by its NATO 
allies in favor of a Chinese-built one.26 
“Turkey is recasting itself as a nonaligned 
country in its rhetoric, which is making 
NATO very uncomfortable,” a Western 
official in Brussels was quoted as saying 
in a Wall Street Journal article discussing 
the Chinese deal; “Turkey’s stance will 
be an issue for years to come, not only if 
the Chinese missile deal happens, but also 
because of its politics.”27
Michael Merz and Max Hoffman 
perfectly summarized Washington’s senti-
ment: “[Turkey’s] role as a reliable NATO 
ally has been questioned [as it] signed 
accords with Russia and China that under-
mine NATO positions, routinely bargains 
with the U.S. over what should be basic 
transactions between allies in the fight 
against ISIS, [and] resorted to rhetorical at-
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tacks [that] only increase latent anti-Amer-
icanism in Turkish society.” The United 
States, wrote Merz and Hoffman, “should 
let the AKP enjoy the ‘precious loneliness’ 
[brought about] by its authoritarian and 
anti-Western shift.”28
In perspective, however, these con-
cerns were not endemic to recent years. In 
2012, for instance, Turkey sparked a crisis 
after it blocked the participation of Israel 
and the European Union in NATO’s Chi-
cago Summit.29 At the previous summit in 
Lisbon in 2010, Turkey had again become 
the Alliance’s “enfant terrible” after its 
holdout on the missile-defense shield.30
Indeed, “losing Turkey” has been a 
perennial leitmotif in NATO-Turkey rela-
tions. In 1996, Thomas Friedman wrote an 
op-ed with the familiar title, “Who Lost 
Turkey?” bemoaning the Islamist ways, 
not of Tayyip Erdoğan, but of his mentor, 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.31 Simi-
lar refrains were raised only a few months 
into AKP’s tenure, when the parliament 
stunned Washington with its refusal to au-
thorize the use of Turkish facilities for Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom on March 1, 2003. 
“If the Turkish parliament doesn’t come 
around and vote to allow U.S. troops on its 
soil, look for diplomatic finger-pointing to 
begin in earnest over Who Lost Turkey?” 
wrote Al Kamen for The Washington Post 
four days after the vote.32 A few months 
later, Soner Cagaptay presciently warned 
about “seismic events” affecting the U.S.-
Turkish relationship: the rise of Islamist 
ideology, Turkey’s realignment with Eu-
rope over the United States, and the ripple 
effect of the 2003 Iraq War. He wrote that, 
while “an obituary for the demise of a half-
century partnership is premature,” under-
standing these new dynamics will be key 
to determining where Turkey’s relationship 
with the United States will go.33
In a 2006 article for the same journal, 
Jonathan Eric Davis was already lamenting 
“the loss of Ankara as a reliable ally” and 
urging “a more active and engaged U.S. 
approach to Ankara.”34 “Who lost Tur-
key? — a complacent West could be forced 
to confront this previously unthinkable 
question within the next few years,” Philip 
Gordon and Omer Taspinar were writing 
the same year, arguing that the bigger risk 
is not Turkey’s alleged Islamization but 
its growing nationalist frustration with the 
United States and Europe for their neglect 
of Turkish national-security interests35 — an 
argument they later developed into a book.36
 By late 2009, Cagaptay’s tone, too, 
had shifted from caution to eulogy over 
the direction of Turkey’s relationship with 
the United States: “Turkey’s experience 
with the AKP proves that Islamism in the 
country’s foreign policy may not be so 
compatible with the West, after all.”37 The 
“Who lost Turkey?” debate was revived in 
2010 after a set-to between U.S. Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates and European 
Commission President Jose Manuel Bar-
roso. Gates blamed Brussels for discourag-
ing Turkey in its negotiations over joining 
the EU, while Barroso blamed Washington 
for turning public opinion against the West 
with the invasion of Iraq.38 Whatever the 
reasons, the implications were quite cer-
tain: a 2010 article in The New York Times 
was bemoaning Turkey’s transition from a 
“pliable ally” to a “thorn for the U.S.”39
The debate abroad was also reverberat-
ing at home. The leading foreign-policy 
figures of the opposition — especially 
three retired ambassadors: the secular 
CHP’s Onur Oymen40 and Faruk Logoglu41 
and the nationalist MHP’s Deniz Boluk-
basi42 — voiced concerns about a funda-
mental transformation of Turkey’s foreign 
policy under the AKP, coining what came 
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to be known as the “axis shift” debate in 
Turkish politics. Curiously, except for a 
few lone dissenters like Oguzlu,43 Turkish 
scholars were quick to dismiss this line of 
reasoning: “The overwhelming majority of 
the Turkish experts studying Turkish for-
eign policy find the ‘axis shift’ argument 
an exaggeration and crude characteriza-
tion,” wrote Onis.44 Instead, “the Davu-
toglu era” was praised as the high tide of 
Turkish foreign policy.45 While some laud-
ed Turkey’s engagement with the Middle 
East as a “new geographic imagination,”46 
others trivialized it as being driven, not by 
security or identity, but by economics.47
Remarkably, the senior foreign-policy 
figures were signaling that Turkey sought 
to change the traditional algorithm of its 
relations with the United States. “The suc-
cess of U.S.-Turkish relations will depend 
on the extent to which the American poli-
cymakers will be willing to accommodate 
Turkey as a new rising power centre in 
the most important corridor region of the 
world,”48 wrote Ibrahim Kalin, Erdoğan’s 
chief foreign-policy adviser. Kalin was 
forewarning that, if Turkey were not ac-
commodated as a new rising power center, 
the United States would risk a default in its 
relations in Turkey.
Yet, the American discourse remained 
fairly optimistic about Turkey’s shift. 
“Turkey’s recent focus on the Middle East 
does not mean that Turkey is about to turn 
its back on the West,” wrote F. Stephen 
Larrabee, “If managed properly, it could 
be an opportunity for Washington and its 
Western allies to use Turkey as a bridge 
to the Middle East.”49 Veteran journalist 
Hugh Pope similarly argued that Turkey 
was “at most, only partly to blame for 
the setbacks suffered by its zero-problem 
foreign policy.”50
WHAT THE ALARMISTS GET 
WRONG
These discourses on Turkey’s loss (and 
rediscovery) by the West were anchored 
in a flawed “presentism.” As Hugh Pope 
elegantly describes, the vacillations of the 
West’s discourse on Turkey followed a 
cyclical pattern, trailing the West’s own 
perceptions of Turkish policy:
There were times when Turkey was 
seen as the good country, when Turkey 
was the model, and Turkey showed 
the Middle East how it could develop 
and how progress could be made — 
a multiplier of Western values and 
market economics in the region. And 
then, almost inexplicably, there would 
be moments when Turkey was the bad 
country, Turkey had gone rogue. You’d 
see headlines — and I really have for-
gotten how many times I’ve seen that 
headline — “Who lost Turkey?” Even-
tually, I decided it actually much more 
reflected what people in Washington, 
D.C., and European capitals were 
actually thinking about themselves and 
how they were dealing with Turkey.51
 The problem with these presentist 
arguments was that they conflated what 
Kenneth Waltz famously called the three 
levels of analysis — the individual, the 
domestic and the systemic contexts.52 
From this perspective, most of the argu-
ments against Turkey’s place in NATO are 
either at the individual level (Erdoğan’s 
careening towards authoritarianism) or the 
domestic levels (Islamization, Gaullism, 
or rising anti-Americanism) but rarely at 
the systemic level, which mattered the 
most for the longevity of Turkey’s security 
partnership with the United States.
On the individual level, it is apparent 
that President Erdoğan stands in stark con-
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trast to his predecessors, including his Is-
lamist patron Necmettin Erbakan. Stephen 
Kinzer described Erbakan as “a grandfa-
therly figure [who] moves delicately, ges-
tures calmly and speaks softly,”53 whereas 
Erdoğan is described as “angry and para-
noid”54 with a “mercurial temperament and 
propensity for rhetorical threats.”55 Yet, on 
the one issue that mattered, Erbakan’s por-
trayal then bears an uncanny resemblance 
to Erdoğan’s portrayal now — Erbakan, 
too, was considered intent on “moving 
Turkey away from its identification with 
Europe and the West.”56 This is not to say 
that personalities do not matter — they 
certainly do57 — but not to the extent 
that the fate of a half-century partnership 
would be upended on their sole basis.
Similarly, the domestic transformations 
in Turkey that are argued as rationales for 
excluding it from NATO’s “value-based 
community” are by no means new. Con-
sider the issue of anti-Americanism. The 
2003 Iraq War surely contributed to anti-
American sentiment in Turkey,58 but this 
followed a global trend also observed in 
other NATO allies.59 Moreover, anti-Amer-
icanism actually had a long history in Tur-
key;60 Turkey’s relations with NATO were 
never smooth sailing.61 While it is true that 
the disappearance of a common existential 
threat (the Soviet Union) complicated Tur-
key’s relations with NATO,62 similar woes 
were also faced by NATO’s European 
allies.63 Indeed, even Cold War-era ac-
counts of Turkey’s security policies framed 
Turkish priorities in invariably pragmatic 
terms based on three contexts: the Soviet 
threat, the Aegean/Cyprus problem and the 
Middle East subsystem.64
The same is true of Turkey’s careen-
ing towards authoritarianism. Turkey was 
never a bulwark of liberal-democratic 
values, but by and large, Turkey’s Atlantic 
allies were rarely bothered by it. Turkey’s 
much-maligned constitution, for example, 
was a legacy of the 1980 junta, which the 
United States had fully backed.65 “For the 
U.S.,” as Tanel Demirel wrote, “preserving 
the integrity of the Turkish state as an ally 
of the West was much more important than 
preserving the democratic regime.”66 Tur-
key’s authoritarianism was not short-lived; 
it preceded the 1980 junta and survived it.67
Indeed, the secular establishment’s au-
thoritarian excesses through the 1980s and 
1990s68 were one reason the AKP victory 
was so widely celebrated. Ahmet Insel, for 
example, wrote, “[AKP’s victory] created 
an unexpected possibility of exit from the 
authoritarian regime established after the 
military coup of September 12, 1980.”69 
Soli Ozel elegantly described the promise 
seen in AKP’s rise:
If the communitarian-liberal synthesis 
works and Turkey’s decent secular 
principles can be rescued from their 
essentially extrinsic yet historically 
stubborn entanglement with authori-
tarianism; if Turkey’s Islamic move-
ment reconciles itself to a secularism 
grounded not only in worry about the 
dangers of politicized religion but also 
in an honest desire to protect reli-
gion’s own integrity and dignity; if the 
military can at last be brought to see 
that it is time to let its inordinate polit-
ical involvements “go gentle into that 
good night,” then the Turkish political 
system will have managed to remodel 
itself along democratic lines.70
Yet, despite some ominous signs, even 
the more astute observers of the political 
class remained tone-deaf. A tragic example 
is Hugh Pope. In 2009, even as Gareth 
Jenkins71 and Dani Rodrik72 had been rais-
ing doubts about due process and factual 
inconsistencies in the now-discredited 
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Ergenekon and Sledgehammer coup-plot 
trials, Pope was convinced that the judges 
“would certainly not have taken so many 
high-profile people into custody unless 
they had an absolute certainty that this is 
a real case.”73 Now, even AKP leaders are 
deflecting the blame on “a conspiracy of 
the Gulenist ‘parallel state.’”74
Similarly, on the Kurdish problem, 
human rights and democratization took a 
backseat to security cooperation and alli-
ance politics, in both the past and the pres-
ent, as argued by a slew of commentators, 
from Eric Edelman75 to Patrick Cockburn76 
to Dov Friedman77 to Leela Jacinto.78
Turkey’s democratic deficit, its author-
itarian tendencies, and the strong under-
currents of anti-Americanism mentioned 
in the works of these commentators were 
always there. These concerns are by no 
means trivial. Yet, it is also true that they 
never sufficed to turn Turkey away from 
NATO or NATO away from Turkey. Why 
should it be different now?
For the U.S.-Turkey security partner-
ship to undergo such a dramatic change, 
there needs to be a paradigmatic shift on 
the systemic level. Hence, the question 
is whether conceptions of national inter-
est, arrangements of power, or dynamics 
of dependency transformed in a way that 
would translate into a meaningful change 
in Turkey’s security partnership with the 
United States and NATO. The answer is 
no, but the dominant discourse on Turkey 
is imbued with the comfort of a flawed 
presentism, which disguises the resilience 
of these overlapping interests at the sys-
temic level.
TURKEY AND NATO 
Despite the breadth of the literature on 
NATO-Turkey relations, the essential ques-
tion of what it means to be allies is never 
explicitly discussed. Recalling David Phil-
lips’s argument that “[NATO] is a coalition 
of countries with shared values,” is this 
really the case? If NATO is indeed a value-
based community, what are these values? 
And what happens when security interests 
clash with the shared values?
In official discourse, the “shared val-
ues” Philips is alluding to are defined in 
minimal terms; in practice, they are paid 
even less attention. President Obama pub-
licly outlined the template U.S.-Turkish 
relations would follow under his adminis-
tration in his 2009 Ankara speech, where 
he identified three pillars of the partner-
ship: Turkey’s status as a “strong, vibrant, 
secular democracy” and its commitment 
to the rule of law; its potential to serve as 
an interlocutor and a model for the Middle 
East and the broader Muslim world as part 
of President Obama’s efforts to patch up 
America’s image in the Muslim world; and 
its important role in the NATO alliance and 
its push for membership in the European 
Union (which together implied the pres-
ervation of Turkey’s organic ties with the 
Western world).79
The three pillars were never really 
compromised. On the issue of Turkey’s 
“strong, vibrant, secular democracy,” as 
shown in the case of the Ergenekon and 
Sledgehammer coup trials, Erdoğan’s 
democratic credentials remained widely 
accepted at home and abroad, even with 
many reasons for skepticism. Aydinli, for 
example, was celebrating these trials as 
the advent of “a new Turkey in which the 
state does not own the society, but society, 
with all its competing elements and actors, 
may very well own the state.”80 Even at 
Obama’s Ankara speech, Turkey’s demo-
cratic problems were not unknown. Obama 
should “develop a joint U.S.-Turkish 
approach to key regional issues,” wrote 
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Joshua W. Walker and Elliot Hen-Tov81 
following Obama’s Ankara speech, but he 
should also “speak truth to power in the 
AKP government” about “minority protec-
tion, religious freedom and stemming xe-
nophobia.” Yet, as has been the case since 
the 1980s, Washington was not bothered. 
Human rights were in U.S.-Turkey rela-
tions never the sine qua non that security 
cooperation was, and they did not become 
one now.
On the issue of Turkey’s engagement 
with the Middle East, as pointed out in the 
Larrabee quote cited above, Turkey’s pivot 
to the Middle East was actually encour-
aged by the United States in the hope that 
it would help to restore the damage the Iraq 
War had dealt to America’s credibility in 
the region. Indeed, despite the occasional 
crises, Turkey remained a reliable partner 
in addressing the “critical challenges” Pres-
ident Obama identified in his 2009 speech, 
such as stabilizing Iraq, pressuring Iran to 
negotiate on its nuclear ambitions and com-
bating terrorism. Moreover, Turkey also 
leveraged the space afforded by its activ-
ist foreign policy to facilitate a diplomatic 
agenda endorsed by Washington: working 
as a backchannel to Iran, facilitating talks 
between Fatah and Hamas, and serving as 
a go-between in Israel’s diplomacy with 
Syria and Palestine. At times, the ways Tur-
key went about these efforts frustrated its 
Western allies, but “even when it has erred, 
the Turkish government has not forsaken 
the goals of many of its Western partners, 
including relieving suffering in Gaza and 
finding a way to prevent Iran from acquir-
ing nuclear weapons.”82
IRAN AND ISRAEL
Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran had 
been a popular cause for Turkey skeptics, 
citing a slew of “contrarian” positions, 
from Turkey’s opposition to the nam-
ing of Iran as a threat to be countered 
by the NATO missile-defense shield,83 
to Erdoğan’s close relations with Iran’s 
inflammatory and obstinate Mahmoud 
Ahmedinejad,84 to its intransigence over 
expanding sanctions against Iran,85 to the 
alleged sharing of NATO intelligence with 
Tehran.86 This narrative, however, conve-
niently overlooks how Turkey eventually 
turned around to support the alliance’s 
policies on all the issues it opposed (e.g., 
the missile-defense shield87), or how it 
played a critical (and thankless) role in 
early nuclear diplomacy with Tehran.
In this regard, the failure of the tripar-
tite nuclear-fuel-swap deal is a particularly 
important case. In 2010, Ankara, along 
with Brazil, managed to broker an agree-
ment that would have drastically reduced 
Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium.88 
This maneuver, which would have been 
an important confidence-building step in 
stalemated negotiations, had been previ-
ously proposed by former IAEA secretary-
general Mohammad ElBaradei, but Iran 
had not agreed.89
In all likelihood, the United States had 
encouraged the deal. Only a few months 
before the Tehran Declaration, President 
Obama had sent a letter to the govern-
ments of Turkey and Brazil setting out the 
conditions under which Washington might 
accept a nuclear fuel swap with Iran,90 and 
just a few weeks before the Turkish-Brazil-
ian initiative, U.S. officials were publicly 
describing the proposed deal as an option 
“still on the table.”91
Yet, when the initiative succeeded in 
getting Iran on board, the United States 
balked, killing the deal by linking it to 
Iran’s immediate, permanent suspension of 
its enrichment activities. This was a mani-
festly unrealistic bar. Indeed, the widely 
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celebrated Vienna Agreement allowed Iran 
to keep 5,060 centrifuges active at Natanz 
and to enrich uranium to 3.67 percent, 
while providing for gradual increases in 
Iran’s enrichment capacity culminating 
in the full removal of limitations after 15 
years.92
The even worse affront, however, was 
the tone of U.S. officials who went on re-
cord to dismiss the deal, whereas the Turk-
ish foreign minister adamantly insisted 
that Secretary Clinton had been briefed on 
his initiative all along.93 From this angle, it 
was the United States that hung Turkey out 
to dry, not vice versa.
Those criticizing Turkey for not taking 
a tougher stance against Iran are failing 
to appreciate the longstanding strategic 
balance between the two countries.94 Their 
common frontier has remained roughly 
unchanged since the 1639 Kasr-i Shirin 
Treaty. Turkey has no zero-sum strategic 
competition with Iran comparable to the 
Saudis’ stakes in Bahrain and Yemen or 
Iran’s territorial disputes with the United 
Arab Emirates. Indeed, most flash points 
of Iran’s grand strategy (like Lebanon, 
Yemen and Bahrain) are not priorities for 
Turkey. In contrast, Turkey and Iran have 
many converging interests, from thwarting 
the rise of the Kurds to carrying Iranian 
gas to European markets to balancing Rus-
sian power in the Caucasus. As in the case 
of the 2010 tripartite nuclear-fuel-swap 
deal, Turkey has sought to leverage these 
attributes to the benefit of its allies and 
has never truly departed from its broader 
commitments to the Atlantic alliance. 
Yet, somehow it is still getting the blame 
for not cheerleading for a war against an 
enemy it did not have.
The same is true with Israel. While 
the rise of political Islam in Turkey and 
the nature of party politics in Israel have 
surely contributed to the worsening of 
bilateral relations, it was structural fac-
tors that drove a wedge between Israel and 
Turkey.95 Indeed, four years before the 
much-maligned altercation in Davos be-
tween Erdoğan and Israeli premier Shimon 
Peres, Mustafa Kibaroglu had forewarned 
that a clash of interests over northern Iraq 
was driving the Turkish-Israeli alliance to 
a crossroads.96
Had the United States preserved its 
traditional relations with Israel, it is likely 
that Washington would have mediated 
these crises, compelling its two close al-
lies to play nicely. Yet, in the year of the 
Davos crisis, the “special relationship 
between Israel and the United States [was] 
about to enter perhaps its rockiest patch 
ever [with Israel] growing exasperated 
with the Obama administration’s effort to 
use diplomacy to roll back Iran’s grow-
ing uranium-enrichment program.”97 As 
the United States careened towards an 
eventual deal with Iran, its relations with 
Israel progressively worsened, hitting rock 
bottom on March 3, 2015, when Israeli 
premier Benjamin Netanyahu joined the 
Republicans in their grudge match against 
President Obama and accepted an invita-
tion from Republicans to argue against the 
administration’s nuclear deal with Iran in 
an address to the Congress.
Netanyahu’s address was the straw that 
broke the camel’s back. “Nearly everyone 
(apart from Congressional Republicans) 
seems to believe that Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu is making a mistake 
in refusing to cancel his March 3 address 
to the U.S. Congress,”98 wrote Lisa Gold-
man at the time of Netanyahu’s speech. A 
day later, John B. Judis wrote that the rift 
created by Netanyahu ended up “threaten-
ing the ‘special relationship’ between the 
United States and Israel, a hallmark [of 
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which had] been its bipartisan nature.99
It is misleading to assess Turkey’s 
changing relations with Israel without 
reference to the dramatic transforma-
tions in U.S.-Israeli relations under the 
Obama administration. Turkey’s increased 
engagement with the Middle East (the 
so-called “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy) 
was surely frustrating to Israel,100 but just 
as frustrating was the Obama administra-
tion’s denial of a carte blanche to Israel in 
its dealings with the Palestinians and Iran. 
In this regard, it is a common mistake to 
project Turkey’s deteriorating relations 
with Israel onto Turkey’s relations with 
the United States; on Israel, Washington 
and Ankara had shared sentiments. Indeed, 
in an address at the Brookings Institution 
on September 9, 2015, former secretary 
of state and current presidential contender 
Hillary Clinton confirmed this argument, 
discussing how she “spent literally years 
trying to get the Israelis to apologize to the 
Turks for the flotilla.”101
WHERE CAN TURKEY GO?
The analysis so far presents a fairly 
compelling picture of (a) the ill-founded 
alarmism of the “losing Turkey” narrative, 
(b) the conflation of agency and structure 
in describing the landscape of the security 
partnership between Turkey and the United 
States, (c) the intact nature of the pillars of 
the U.S.-Turkey security partnership, and 
(d) the failure of the dominant narrative 
to properly contextualize the causes and 
implications of Turkey’s “outlier” interac-
tions with Iran and Israel. Before conclud-
ing, however, let it be assumed that the 
entire analysis in this paper is wrong, and 
that Turkey is indeed careening away from 
its Atlantic allies. Where can Turkey go?
Ostensibly, the expectation is for 
Turkey to emerge as a challenger to the 
United States in its perceived sphere of 
influence and to join, with Russia and 
China, an “axis of the excluded.”102 Along 
these lines, Turkey’s long-range-missile 
defense deal with China has been widely 
cited as the smoking gun for such a para-
digm shift. This critique, however, reflects 
a distorted understanding of Ankara’s 
rationale. Turkey has ambitious plans to 
expand its defense exports. Considering 
that Turkey lacks the defense-industrial 
base to indigenously design and develop 
its own air defense system, it is only 
reasonable to leverage acquisition power 
for optimal conditions in joint production, 
technology transfer and export prospects. 
Turkey’s concerns are not exclusive. When 
CPMIEC (Chinese Precision Machinery 
Import-Export Corporation) balked at Tur-
key’s technology-transfer conditions, Tur-
key reopened talks with the second-best 
bidder, Eurosam — indicating Turkey’s 
eagerness to give the U.S. or European 
bidders the latitude to revise their bids to 
meet its demands.
Ankara knew that its deal with China 
was less than optimal, as there are strong 
concerns about the Chinese platform. The 
Atlantic Council’s James Hasik described 
what Turkey was acquiring as “the air 
defense equivalent ‘of a 1991 Hyundai,’ 
which would not be a good deal even at a 
Volkswagen price.”103 What drove Turkey 
and its Western allies apart was neither 
price nor performance, but the double 
standards Ankara perceived in how its 
aspirations for long-range missile defense 
are handled by its Western allies, who are 
hesitating to offer Turkey the favorable 
technology-transfer conditions they have 
offered other allies in much less critical 
theaters — Australia, New Zealand, Por-
tugal and Sweden. In other words, Ankara 
was moving forward with China because 
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it was hearing in the Western objections to 
its missile-defense plans echoed of David 
Cameron’s 2010 remarks: that it is guard-
ing the camp but not allowed to sit in the 
tent. Turkey’s alliance with China was one 
of necessity, not preference. Indeed, just 
as this article was going into print, Turkey 
announced that it is canceling not only 
its contract talks with the Chinese but the 
entire missile-defense tender and instead 
moving forward with an indigenous pro-
gram. This is another instance of Turkey’s 
forcing its hand but eventually turning 
around to support the Alliance’s policies.
Further evidence that Turkey remains 
firmly entrenched in the Western camp is 
found in the Turkish reaction to increased 
Russian involvement in Syria. “Russia 
doesn’t have a border with Syria,” charged 
Erdoğan in an interview with Al-Jazeera 
right after Russia launched airstrikes in 
Syria, “I want to understand why Russia 
is so interested in Syria.”104 The United 
States has no border with Syria either, 
but Erdoğan never directed the question 
at Washington. Instead, he bemoaned, 
“Turkey is bearing the brunt of the crisis in 
Syria whereas the U.S. is standing on the 
sidelines.”
Erdoğan’s press briefing on October 10 
was even more direct. He called Russian 
involvement in Syria a “grave mistake... 
that would only further isolate Russia” 
and warned — in a thinly veiled threat to 
downscale relations — “the depth of Rus-
sia’s bilateral relations with Turkey can’t 
compare with its relations with Syria.”105 
Even in the worst of times with the United 
States, Ankara’s parlance towards Wash-
ington never escalated to such levels of 
antagonism.
While Russia’s entrance into the Syrian 
game will inevitably push Turkey closer 
to the United States, this should not be 
expected to bring Turkey into lockstep 
with Washington. Erdoğan, for example, 
remains adamantly opposed to supporting 
the Kurdish militia PYD in northern Syria. 
As echoed in a recent assessment by the 
pro-government think-tank SETA (Foun-
dation for Political, Economic and Social 
Studies), “If a new Kurdish autonomous 
entity becomes permanently established 
in northern Syria, Turkey may eventually 
work with it, as it has done with KRG. But 
in a scenario where Turkey is threatened 
by such an entity or by the PKK’s efforts 
to use it as its backyard, cooperation would 
be impossible and Turkey could come 
into conflict with a U.S.-enabled entity in 
northern Syria.”106
A CHANGING WORLD
As Hugh Pope astutely observed, the 
narrative moves in cycles. Every now and 
then, someone asks, “Who lost Turkey?” 
and another responds, arguing that Tur-
key is not lost and that its alliance with 
the West is alive and well. But this time, 
there is a difference: “losing Turkey” can 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Turkey is seeking to upgrade itself 
from a “junior partner” to a “regional 
power.” Where this agenda is running into 
resistance from the West, Turkey is taking 
bold and unconventional steps—as it did 
with the long-range missile deal with Chi-
na—to show that it’s not without options. 
In reality, both Washington and Ankara 
are beholden to each other. As the saying 
goes, better the devil you know; after half 
a century, one comes to know one’s devil 
pretty well.
This is not to say that the future of the 
U.S.-Turkey security partnership will be 
smooth sailing. In 2010, Pope wrote that a 
“reason to be more sanguine about Tur-
key’s foreign policy is that, despite recent 
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strains, the fundamentals of Turkey’s alli-
ances with the West have not changed.”107 
Today, those fundamentals are slowly but 
steadily changing. The idea of “the West” 
does not have the moral, political and 
economic weight it used to carry. It is not 
as powerful as it used to be, morally or 
economically. Turkey has its face turned 
towards the West, but its feet are standing 
in the East. A future where the West’s allure 
fades holds the specter of an illiberal re-
surgence. It is this angst that the persistent 
fears of “losing Turkey” are anchored in.
The remedy to these fears, however, is 
to pull Turkey towards the West, not push it 
further away by failing to heed its legiti-
mate political, economic and security inter-
ests, and throwing tantrums when Turkey 
seeks to assert those interests on its own.
A robust alliance between the United 
States and Turkey cannot be premised on 
turning Ankara around to Washington’s 
policies kicking and screaming. It can only 
endure through a constructive dialogue be-
tween Turkey and its allies towards identi-
fying the fulcrum that keeps a delicate bal-
ance between Turkey’s legitimate security 
interests and the broader objectives of its 
allies. A partnership that covers Turkey’s 
legitimate security interests would also 
have a centripetal effect, pulling Turkey 
closer to the West. Entrenching Turkey’s 
perception of exclusion and double stan-
dards would have a centrifugal effect, 
pushing Turkey away from the moral and 
political axis of the Atlantic Alliance. 
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